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Abstract: The temple of Medinet Habu in Thebes stands as Ramesses III‘s lasting legacy 
to Ancient Egyptian history.  This monumental structure not only contained luxury goods 
within, but also a goldmine of information inscribed on its outside walls.  Here, Ramesses 
adorned the temple with stories of military campaigns he led against enemies in the north 
who hoped to gain control of Egypt.  These war accounts have posed a series of problems 
to modern scholars.  Today, the debate still rages over how the inscriptions should be 
interpreted.  This work analyzes Ramesses‘s records through the lens of socioeconomic 
decline that occurred during his rule in order to demonstrate the role ideology—namely 
ma‘at—played in his self-representation and his methodology to ensure and legitimize his 
rule during these precarious times. 
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Figure 1: Map of Ancient Egypt with key sites.  Image reproduced from Marc Van De Mieroop, A 




When describing his victory over invading forces in the north of Egypt, Ramesses 
III, ruler at the time, wrote:  
…Those who came on land were overthrown and slaughtered…Amon-Re was after them destroying them.  
Those who entered the river mouths were like birds ensnared in the net…their leaders were carried off and 
slain.  They were thrown down and pinioned…1 
 
This excerpt, which dates to 1181 BCE, is only a small fragment of a much larger 
collection of inscriptions that details Ramesses‘s military campaigns in the Delta 
Region.
2
  These inscriptions, located on the Temple of Medinet Habu in Thebes, discuss 
conflicts that Ramesses faced in years five, eight, and eleven of his rule.  According to 
Ramesses‘s records, invaders in the Delta region launched a series of attacks during those 
years in an attempt to gain control of Egypt.  Ramesses alludes to the formidable nature 
of these enemies, crediting them with the destruction of the major Near Eastern states of 
the period.  Yet, thanks to his leadership and excellent strategy, Egypt was able to thwart 
the invaders‘ advances.  The inscriptions conclude with Ramesses‘s triumphant return to 
Egypt and a list of the spoils of war he brought back with him.
3
 
 While Ramesses‘s accounts seemingly provide a goldmine of information, 
modern scholars have questioned their validity.  Nancy Sandars refers to Ramesses‘s 
records as ―panegyric and bluster,‖ adding ―as a historical record they are meager.‖4  
Marc Van De Mieroop echoes these ideas, writing that ―Ramesses III‘s portrayal of 
                                                        
1
 William F. Edgerton and John A. Wilson, Historical Records of Ramses III: The Texts in Medinet Habu 
Vol I and II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), 30-31.  This work will also use the translation of 
James Henry Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt Volume IV (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906), 
3-83.  Both translations are widely accepted and for the purpose of this study they will be used 
interchangeably.   
2
 All dates are based upon the chronology provided by Ian Shaw, The Oxford History of Egypt (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 480-89. 
3
 See pages 6-9, The Medinet Habu Inscriptions, for a more detailed discussion of Ramesses‘s narrative.   
4
 Nancy Sandars, The Sea Peoples: Warriors of the Ancient Mediterranean 1250-1150 BC (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1978), 119-120. 
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sudden invasions was certainly false.‖5  The question, then, is why Ramesses went to 
such great lengths to detail his victories in what are believed to be fictitious military 
campaigns.  If he did not aim to leave behind an accurate historical record, then what was 
his intention?   
Although no conclusive evidence exists to corroborate Ramesses‘s accounts, his 
inscriptions do, in fact, provide a useful historical record; they help reveal the fragile 
nature of his power and can be interpreted as an attempt to legitimize his authority.  
When placed within the chronology of the larger Near East, Ramesses‘s rule, which dates 
from 1186-1154 BCE, coincides with the collapse of the Near Eastern International 
System.
6
  This international system, which lasted from 1600-1100 BCE, was a period 
defined by cross-cultural and economic exchanges between palace complexes that ruled 
over the various Near Eastern territorial states.  The most prominent of these included 
Hatti and Egypt in the west, Babylonia, Assyria, and Elam farther east, and the Mycenaen 
civilization in the Aegean.
7
  Historians equate the end of this system with the collapse of 




 Ramesses‘s accounts can be placed within this larger framework of international 
collapse, providing evidence for the problems he confronted and the loss of control he 
suffered.  The conflicts Ramesses describes in the Delta suggest that Egyptian authority 
was weakening in this area, and the cultural heterogeneity he mentions further threatened 
                                                        
5
 Marc Van De Mieroop, The Eastern Mediterranean in the Age of Ramesses II (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010), 242-43. 
6
 Shaw, Oxford History, 485. 
7
 For an overview of this period see Mario Liverani, International Relations in the Ancient Near East, 
1600-1100 BC (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
8
 Robert Drews, The End of the Bronze Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3-7. 
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the stability of the region.  The inscriptions from Medinet Habu also suggest the 
increased role of religion in Egyptian politics; support from religious authorities was 
needed to bolster a faltering political system.  The Medinet Habu inscriptions therefore 
served as an ideological counter-argument to the problems of social unrest which 
Ramesses faced during his rule.  In this regard, they represent one example in a long-
standing pattern in which pharaohs sought to justify and preserve their power via grand 
ideological narratives portraying their proper adherence to Egyptian customs and 
depicting themselves as military heroes.  At the heart of this narrative about royal power 
and royal legitimacy was the concept of ma‘at, a quality of strength, wisdom, integrity, 
and piety that a good pharaoh was thought to embody.  It is my contention that both 
Ramesses‘s textual inscriptions and the images that accompanied them served to present 
him as a ruler who upheld ma‘at.  In the tumultuous years of his reign, this sort of display 
was essential for justifying his authority.     
 This thesis will be divided into three parts.  The first describes the Medinet Habu 
inscriptions along with modern scholars‘ interpretations of the accounts.  After the 
historiographical groundwork has been laid, the text will move to a discussion of the 
internal situation in Egypt during Ramesses‘s rule.  Here it will be argued that the 
problems in Egypt at this time threatened Ramesses‘s power because they weakened his 
claim to ma‘at.  The final section of this thesis will then analyze Ramesses‘s Medinet 
Habu inscriptions more closely, in order to demonstrate how they present him as a ruler 




The Medinet Habu Inscriptions 
The Temple of Medinet Habu is located in the western part of Thebes, an 
important religious center and pharaonic power base in Upper Egypt.
9
  William Murnane 
has argued that it resembles a fort as much as it does a temple, containing high defensive 
walls and limited entryways to restrict access.  The temple also contained rooms 
accessible to only Ramesses and his closest attendants, and the remains of what appear to 










On the northern and western walls of this temple, Ramesses inscribed a series of 
both written and pictorial reliefs that recounted his battles against enemies in the north.
11
  
                                                        
9
 Van De Mieroop, A History of Ancient Egypt, 248-50. 
10
 William Murnane, United With Eternity: A Concise Guide to the Monuments of Medinet Habu (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980), 1-6. 
11
 Murnane, United With Eternity, 11. 
Figure 2:  (left) Overall layout of the Medinet Habu Complex. (right) Detailed plan of Ramesses III’s inner 
court.  His war reliefs are found on the northern and western walls of this court. (bottom) Aerial view of the 
Medinet Habu Complex prior to extensive excavation.  Images reproduced from Murnane, United With 
Eternity, 5, 8, & 3, respectively. 
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According to these inscriptions, Egypt was attacked from the north on three separate 
occasions during his reign.  Ramesses writes that the first conflict of year five was 
instigated by Libyan tribes that had moved into the northern and western parts of the 
Delta.  The conflict of year eight also involved the Libyan tribes, but the main antagonists 
were a group known as the ―Sea Peoples‖ along with their cohorts from the ―Asiatic Hill 
Countries.‖  The final conflict of year eleven involved a group of people known as the 
Meshwesh, who recruited Libyan support in an attempt to enter Egypt.
12
  
While the perpetrators in each war may have been different, they were all accused 
of committing the same egregious acts.  In his narrative, Ramesses maligns his opponents 
for ―violating his frontier‖ and criticizes them for their ambitions to rule over Egypt.13  
The records also imply that some sort of political association existed between Egypt and 
the Libyan bands, which Ramesses claims the Libyan chieftains disregarded.
14
   
After making clear the malicious goals of his enemies, Ramesses describes his 
own preparations for battle and retells the victories he achieved.  While many details of 
the actual campaigns are omitted, Ramesses focuses on his rallying of the people of 
Egypt and the battle strategies he devised.  Before the start of each campaign, Ramesses 
is shown addressing ―the entire land gathered together: the Court, the royal sons, the 
chamberlains [of] the palace, all inhabitants of Egypt, the (military) classes, and every 
youth who is in this land‖ from a balcony atop his ―migdol.‖15  He explains to those 
                                                        
12
 For the year five campaign, see either Edgerton & Wilson, Historical Records, 19-35 or Breasted, 
Ancient Records IV, 35-58.  For the year eight campaign, see either Edgerton & Wilson, Historical 
Records, 49-59 or Breasted, Ancient Records IV, 59-82.  For the year eleven campaign, see either Edgerton 
& Wilson, Historical Records, 87-94 or Breasted, Ancient Records IV, 83-114. 
13
 For Ramesses‘s year five accusations, see Edgerton & Wilson, Historical Records, 26.  For the 
accusations of year eight see 55.  For the accusations of year eleven see 91.   
14
 Mention of this political association can be found in the year five record, Edgerton & Wilson, Historical 
Records, 25-6 and in the year eleven record, 91-92.  No such mention is made in the year eight records.   
15
 Edgerton & Wilson, Historical Records, 52.   
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gathered before him of their enemies‘ plans but assures them that he will emerge 
victorious.  Ramesses devotes much space to explaining his plan to defeat the Sea 
Peoples in his year eight campaign, a strategy that involved firing arrows onto enemy 
ships from a series of hidden encampments along the Delta.
16
  As Ramesses tells it, his 





Figure 3: Ramesses III distributing arms to his soldiers before their battle against the Sea Peoples.  
This image accompanies Ramesses’s year eight inscriptions.  Image reproduced from Murnane, 
United With Eternity, 14. 
 
A large portion of the Medinet Habu inscriptions recounts the aftermath of the 
northern campaigns and Ramesses‘s return to Egypt.  The inscriptions list the number of 
hands and phalluses severed from the slaughtered enemies and depict captured enemies 
being led back to Egypt in chains.
18
  Ramesses writes that these prisoners of war were 
given to the temple complexes to be used as laborers, and he also lists gifts of land that he 
granted to the temples.
19
 
                                                        
16
 Edgerton & Wilson, Historical Records, 41-3 & 54-5. 
17
 Edgerton & Wilson, Historical Records, 45 & 56. 
18
 Edgerton & Wilson, Historical Records, 15, 60, & 63-8. 
19
 Edgerton & Wilson, Historical Records, 33, 58, 63-70, & 103-5.  See Drews, End of the Bronze Age, 47-
51, for a review of Ramesses‘s numbers and an explanation of how circumcision may have played a role in 
Ramesses‘s ethnic classification of his enemies.   
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Figure 4: Egyptian soldiers collecting hands and phalluses of defeated enemies after the First Libyan 
War (War of year five).  Image reproduced from Murnane, United With Eternity, 13. 
 
In addition to the military narrative itself, much of the inscriptions discuss life in 
Egypt under Ramesses‘s rule.  Ramesses describes Egypt as a land ―rich in supplies and 
provisions‖ and proclaims that the country was ―filled with jubilations‖ because of his 
successes.
20
  The overall tone of the war reliefs is celebratory: Egypt under Ramesses is 
compared favorably to the unproductive and insecure times before his ascension.  
Ramesses seemingly swats away the northern aggressors who appear to be the only 
source of agitation during his kingship and an insignificant one at that.   
 
Historical Inaccuracies and Problematic Interpretations 
 Some scholars have accepted Ramesses‘s statements at face value in an effort to 
explain the events occurring in Egypt under his rule.  These analyses are often too literal, 
however, and they lack the close scrutiny required.  Alessandra Nibbi‘s work, for 
example, demonstrates the problems that arise from a surface-level study of the text.
21
  
Nibbi uses Ramesses‘s accounts to redefine the traditional borders of Egypt, concluding 
that Ramesses had completely lost authority over the Delta at this time.  She fixes 
                                                        
20
 Edgerton & Wilson, Historical Records, 33 & 52. 
21
 The following is a summary of Nibbi‘s argument, drawn from Alessandra Nibbi, The Sea Peoples and 
Egypt (New Jersey: Noyes Press, 1975). 
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Egypt‘s new northern border at Heliopolis because Ramesses claimed to have both 
stopped his enemies‘ advances near the mouth of the Delta and because he referred to the 
city directly as the seat of his power.
22
  Nibbi‘s argument also relies on a re-interpretation 
of the accepted translation.  She interprets the isles in Ramesses‘s claim ―as for the 
foreign countries, they made a conspiracy in their isles‖ to mean the marshlands of the 
Nile Delta instead of islands in the Mediterranean that were home to the invaders 
Ramesses fought.
23
  She anachronistically associates the phrase ―Great Green,‖ which 
scholars have translated as ―Sea,‖ to its original meaning of locations in the Delta 
Swamps containing long scrolls of papyrus.
24
  In addition, Nibbi argues that Ramesses‘s 
listing of Lower Egypt as one of the ―Nine Bows,‖ a term traditionally referring to the 
kingdom‘s enemies, shows that the Delta was no longer part of Egypt.25  Using this 
evidence, Nibbi concludes that the Delta inhabitants never considered themselves part of 
Egypt proper, and she points to earlier skirmishes within the region to suggest that 
Egyptian history could be defined through Upper Egypt‘s struggle to maintain control 
over the Delta.
26
    
 Although Nibbi‘s argument is persuasive in some respects, it also poses several 
problems.  While she correctly argues that unification was often achieved through a 
pattern of conquest in which dynasties from Upper Egypt took control of Lower Egypt, 
no evidence exists to suggest that Lower Egypt actively resisted this unification effort. 
On the contrary, it is likely that the Delta region supported this unification, since both 
iconography and politics indicate it to be an integral part of the Egyptian system.  Indeed, 
                                                        
22
 Nibbi, The Sea Peoples, 69-70. 
23
 Nibbi, The Sea Peoples, 48-51. 
24
 Nibbi, The Sea Peoples, 35-8 & 44-8. 
25
 Nibbi, The Sea Peoples, 7-9. 
26
 Nibbi, The Sea Peoples, 9-31. 
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only when a king claimed control of both Upper and Lower Egypt was the realm 
considered united, a concept expressed pictorially through imagery such as the sedge and 
papyrus and the lung and windpipe.
27
  That Memphis, a city located along the mouth of 
the Delta, had long served as an important seat of pharaonic power also reveals the key 
role Lower Egypt played in Egyptian society.
28
  The priesthood of Ptah, which also 
resided in this city, became an official palace cult and maintained a strong following 
throughout the Delta.
29
  Furthermore, the Delta was integral to Egyptian trade networks, 
as sailors leaving Egypt needed to navigate through the Delta Region to reach the 
Mediterranean Sea, and those entering would need to traverse it before reaching the Nile 
proper.  While alternate trading routes through the wadis (riverbeds) in the eastern deserts 
did exist, the Delta was a crucial part of the Egyptian economy.
30
 
 A second problem with Nibbi‘s argument is that she relies solely on the Medinet 
Habu inscriptions without considering other sources of evidence.  While Ramesses‘s 
claims may merit changing Egypt‘s northern border if considered in isolation, outside of 
these accounts there is no evidence to validate such a change.  Egypt‘s control over the 
Delta might have been waning, but there is little reason to believe Ramesses had fully lost 
authority over the area.  Contemporary textual and iconographic records continue to 
depict the Delta as part of Egypt, meaning that Nibbi was likely wrong to claim that it 
                                                        
27
 Van De Mieroop, A History of Ancient Egypt, 35-6.  The sedge and papyrus are the symbolic plants of 
Upper and Lower Egypt, respectively.  In Egyptian hieroglyphs, the lung and windpipe share the same 
sound as the verb ―to unite.‖   See Van De Mieroop, A History of Ancient Egypt, 27 for further information.  
Unification of Upper and Lower Egypt under one dynasty was understood as the natural state of Egyptian 
society.  
28 Van De Mieroop, A History of Ancient Egypt, 30. 
29
 Richard H. Wilkinson, The Complete Gods and Goddesses of Ancient Egypt (New York: Thames & 
Hudson, 2003), 123-126.   
30
 Marc Van De Mieroop. ―Economic Theories and the Ancient Near East,‖ in Commerce and Monetary 
Systems in the Ancient World: Means of Transmission and Cultural Interaction, ed. R. Rollinger & C. Ulf. 
Munich (Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), 54-64.  See also Van De Mieroop, Eastern Mediterranean, 186-188. 
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existed as a separate entity.
31
  Nibbi‘s interpretation also falters because it distorts the 
context of the inscriptions.  While Ramesses does indeed list Lower Egypt as one of the 
Nine Bows, he does so only on one occasion during his eighth regal year; references to 
the Nine Bows made in years five and eleven do not include Lower Egypt.
32
  
Furthermore, in light of the events that occurred throughout the wider Near East during 
Ramesses‘s reign, it is highly improbable that the islands to which he refers represent 
Delta marshlands.  Rather, most scholars concur that these islands are located in the 
Mediterranean and were home to the Sea Peoples, although their exact location remains 
fiercely contested.
33
   
 James Weinstein adopts a more conservative approach in his analysis but also 
tries to connect the inscriptions to actual events, arguing that while Ramesses was ―a 
plagiarizer and self-aggrandizer of the first order…[his] claims to have fought the Sea 
Peoples have the ring of historical reality.‖34  To this end, Weinstein presents five pieces 
of evidence that suggest the battles Ramesses described may have actually occurred.  He 
argues that both the names of the invaders and locations of attack differ between 
Ramesses‘s records and earlier accounts, meaning that Ramesses was not simply copying 
earlier claims.  In addition, Weinstein interprets the lack of Sea Peoples‘ style pottery in 
Western Asia and the Levant as indicative that Ramesses expelled them from these areas.  
                                                        
31
 Evidence of a split between Lower and Upper Egypt is only found later, during the Third Intermediate 
Period (1069-715 BCE).  During this time, we see the emergence of two separate (and competing) power 
bases, Tanis in Lower Egypt and Thebes in Upper Egypt.   
32
 See Edgerton & Wilson, Historical Records, 46, for the sole mention of Lower Egypt as part of the ―Nine 
Bows.‖ 
33
 While the questions surrounding the origins and identity of the Sea Peoples will not be tackled in this 
work, there is a large corpus of information on the subject.  Central works include Eliezer Oren, Sea 
Peoples and Their World:  a Reassessment (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), Nancy 
Sandars‘ Sea Peoples, and Immanuel Velikovsky, Peoples of the Sea (Garden City: Doubleday, 1977).  
34
 James Weinstein, ―Collapse of the Egyptian Empire in the Southern Levant,‖ in The Crisis Years: The 
12
th
 Century B.C. Ed. William Ward & Martha Joukowsky (Iowa: Kendall-Hunt Publishing, 1992), 148. 
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The discovery of Egyptian style pottery in these same places led Weinstein to conclude 
that Egypt still had control over these regions during Ramesses‘s early years.35   
 Although Weinstein‘s analysis is superior to Nibbi‘s because it examines both the 
inscriptions and the archaeological record, it too contains serious flaws.  Two of the five 
points Weinstein provides are based on a lack of positive evidence, not any existing 
supplementary materials.  Furthermore, Weinstein‘s final point concerning Egypt‘s 
territorial extent seems unlikely in light of the internal stagnation and decline of Egyptian 
society under Ramesses‘s leadership.  Weinstein‘s initial claim regarding the unique 
names and places listed in the Medinet Habu accounts also relies too heavily on a literal 
reading of the text, especially considering the identity of Ramesses‘s enemies is still 
relatively obscure.    
 Interpretations such as those of Nibbi and Weinstein ultimately fail not only 
because of a lack of supporting positive evidence, but also because substantial records 
exist refuting Ramesses‘s claims of massive warfare and rampant invasion throughout the 
Near East.  To this end, several modern scholars have explored the problems of accepting 
a literal interpretation of Ramesses‘s accounts.  Van De Mieroop, for instance, argues that 
the attacks could not have occurred at the time or the place the inscriptions describe.
36
  
Ramesses explains that Egypt was the final target in a massive invasion of the Near East 
and credits his enemies with the complete and rapid destruction of ―Hatti, Kode, 
Carchemish, Yereth, and Yeres on‖ as they traveled toward Egypt‘s northern border.37  
Van De Mieroop, however, writes that the archaeological record does not support such a 




 Van De Mieroop, Eastern Mediterranean, 235-253.  See also the corpus of literature listed on 253-54 
from which he draws this analysis.   
37
 Edgerton & Wilson, Historical Records, 53. 
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claim but rather indicates that the entire region suffered a prolonged period of gradual 
decline.
38
  This argument was buttressed by the work of Jürgen Seeher, chief excavator at 
the Hittite capital of Hatti.  The destruction layers of the city, he argued, indicate it was 
gradually abandoned with little sense of urgency and that although the city eventually 
burned to the ground, this occurred about a decade after it had already been 
depopulated.
39
  Similar archaeological records at Mycenae, along with the discovery of 
fault lines which appear to be the result of an earthquake, further weaken Ramesses‘s 
claim that the enemies he fought caused the sudden and widespread destruction of the 
Late Bronze Age Mediterranean superpowers.
40
 
 If the archaeological record casts the validity of Ramesses‘s narrative in serious 
doubt, then the absence of supporting Egyptian evidence further heightens these 
suspicions.  Apart from his own boasts, no textual or material evidence from his years as 
king exist to support the military activities he describes.  Only the Papyrus Harris, a 
document written after the death of Ramesses III, contains information concerning his 
campaigns in the north, and even this document is inconsistent when compared to the 
Medinet Habu inscriptions, differing in both the number of enemies captured or killed 
and the ethnic backgrounds of Ramesses‘s opponents. 41  Leonard Lesko has argued, in 
fact, that the Papyrus Harris cannot serve as a supplement to the Medinet Habu 
                                                        
38
 Van De Mieroop, Eastern Mediterranean, 245-47. 
39
 Jürgen Seeher. ―Die Zerstörung der Stadt Hattusa‖, in Akten des IV. Internationlen Kongresses für 
Hethitologie Würzburg, 4.-8. Oktober 1999, ed. G. Wilhem (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999) 623-34.  This 
is the original language source to which Van De Mieroop refers.  See Eastern Mediterranean, 240-241 for 
his discussion of Seeher‘s work.  See also Maureen Basedow, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 62, 
No. 4 (October 2003), pp. 310-311, for an English language review of Seeher‘s article.   
40
 Drews, End of the Bronze Age, 33-47; Sandars, Sea Peoples, 179-196; Van De Mieroop, Eastern 
Mediterranean, 246-47. 
41
 For an English language translation of the Papyrus Harris, see Breasted, Ancient Records IV, 87-206. 
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inscriptions because the former is too vague and laudatory.
42
  The text begins with the 
phrase ―See, I will inform you of other events which were done in Egypt since my reign,‖ 
which Lesko believes to mean that the accomplishments listed in the Papyrus Harris are 
not restricted to the reign of Ramesses III but also include those of previous pharaohs.
43
  
James Breasted, one of the earliest translators of the Medinet Habu inscriptions, cites two 
additional problems with Ramesses‘s writings.  Firstly, the inscriptions are unclear in 
subject, audience, and action, and Ramesses often makes no attempt to differentiate 
between speakers or events.  Secondly, Ramesses‘s narrative is highly poetic and uses 
figurative language whose true meaning could only be understood by contemporary 
readers.
44
  The situation is further muddled because Ramesses often repeats statements 
from earlier texts.  Most notably, the battles that he describes are nearly identical to those 
in King Merneptah‘s (r. 1213-1203 BCE) Great Karnak Inscriptions of the Thirteenth 
Century BCE.  Ramesses III also copies portions of Ramesses II‘s inscriptions from the 
latter‘s Ramesseum and transplants them onto his own reliefs.45  The Medinet Habu 
inscriptions thus blur fact and fiction and are temporally inaccurate, making it difficult to 
construct a reliable narrative from them.   
 
The Real Issues at Hand: A Crumbling Society and an Insecure Ruler 
 The question then becomes one of purpose: why did Ramesses go to such great 
lengths to show himself the victor in these massive, yet fictitious, military campaigns?  If 
                                                        
42
 Leonard Lesko, ―The Wars of Rameses III. Serapis 6 (1980): 83-86 & Leonard Lesko, ―Egypt in the 12th 
Century B.C.‖ in The Crisis Years: The 12th Century B.C. Ed. William Ward & Martha Joukowsky (Iowa: 
Kendall-Hunt Publishing, 1992) 151-156. 
43
 Lesko, ―Egypt in the 12th Century B.C.,‖ 153. 
44
 Breasted, Ancient Records IV, 3-4 & 12-14. 
45
 Lesko, ―Egypt in the 12th Century B.C.,‖ 152-54.  See also Van De Mieroop, A History of Ancient Egypt, 
248-50. 
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he did not intend an accurate narrative, then what did he seek to accomplish?  How 
should modern scholars interpret his inscriptions?  Leonard Lesko, in his contribution to 
The Crisis Years Anthology, posed a set of similar quandaries, although his work only 
begins to scratch the surface of the issue.  Lesko proposed that Ramesses‘s use of recut 
blocks from the Ramesseum and Karnak Temple, as well as the numerical and 
chronological inconsistencies between the Medinet Habu inscriptions and the Papyrus 
Harris, suggest that Ramesses was more interested in self-commemoration than historical 
accuracy, but he neglects to develop this idea further.
46
  
An analysis of the situation in Egypt during Ramesses‘s rule reveals why he 
might have sought to portray himself as protector of the realm under assault from 
outsiders.  James Weinstein has argued that the first phase of the collapse of the Egyptian 
Empire began during the end of Ramesses III‘s rule, and the temporal gap between this 
period and the earlier Medinet Habu inscriptions is small enough to safely assume the 
issues that brought about this collapse had been brewing in his early regal years.
47
  
Indeed, the high levels of tension within Egypt during the construction of Medinet Habu 
are reflected in the highly defensive nature of the temple itself.  This was a period of 
starvation, economic collapse, and overall unruliness of the general population.  Although 
it is unlikely that the battles Ramesses described occurred, evidence does exist to show 
that during his reign Egypt suffered from tensions caused by foreign pressure and 
economic decline.  
During Ramesses‘s rule, foreign pressure took the form of both immigration into 
Egypt and cultural diffusion.  Robert Drews, in his survey on the collapse of the Late 
                                                        
46
 Lesko, ―Egypt in the 12th Century BC.‖ 
47
 Weinstein, ―Collapse of the Egyptian Empire,‖ 147. 
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Bronze Age, has interpreted relief scenes on Medinet Habu depicting families in ox-carts 
entering Egypt to promote an argument that various tribes from the north and west 
migrated into the region at this time.
48
  To this end, records from years five and eleven 
describe how the Libyans ―disregarded the beauty of this god who slays the invader of 
Egypt
49, saying… ‗We will settle in Egypt,‘‖ and documentation from as early as the 
reign of King Merneptah catalogues the movement of people from both Libya and lands 
to the east into the northern and western parts of the Delta.
50
  While the Egyptians were 
never truly isolated from foreign peoples, the migration of groups such as Libyans and 
Syrians must have been alarming.  Foreigners who entered Egypt were normally 
prisoners of war or part of diplomatic exchanges; that non-Egyptians would migrate into 










                                                        
48
 Drews, End of the Bronze Age, 48-72.  See also Sandars, Sea Peoples, 120-124. 
49
 Possibly Ramesses III referring to himself. 
50
 This excerpt is taken from Breasted, Ancient Records IV, 57. For additional references to Libyan 
settlements in the Delta, see 23-24 & 52.  For the records dating to Merneptah‘s rule, See Van De Mieroop, 
Eastern Mediterranean, 51-52. 
51
 Whitney Davis, The Canonical Tradition in Ancient Egyptian Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989).  See also Van De Mieroop, A History of Ancient Egypt, 108-112, 118.  This view of outsiders 
is evident even in the earliest hieroglyphic script (which emerged somewhere between 3250-2900 BCE), in 
which foreigners are depicted as bound captives.    
Figure 5: This detail from a year eight relief depicts ox-carts, women, and children in the battle scene.  
Images such as these have been used to argue that foreign peoples were migrating into Egypt during the 
rule of Ramesses III.  Image reproduced from Sandars, Sea Peoples, 123. 
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Cultural diffusion also contributed a great deal to the social tensions in Egypt 
under Ramesses‘s rule.  Liverani has defined the time between 1600-1100 BCE as the 
Age of Internationalism, a period marked by diplomatic and economic exchanges among 
the great powers of the Near East.
52
  Egypt readily integrated itself into this system, as 
evidenced by the discovery of Minoan artwork at Malqata and Akhetaten and lapis lazuli 
at Tod.
53
  Cultural exchanges also played a crucial role.  Along with artworks and foreign 
luxuries, Egypt opened its pantheon to foreign deities for the first time.  Most notably, the 
Syrian gods were assimilated into the Egyptian pantheon.  Given Egyptian counterparts, 
these Syrian deities were included in literary tales and had cults devoted to them.
54
   
This picture-perfect image of cultural integration was far from the reality of the 
situation, however, and the influx of foreign groups into Egypt was probably not well 
received.  These new gods would have diluted the importance of established Egyptian 
cults, such as the Priesthood of Amun in Thebes, whose influence had become a 
necessary component of the pharaoh‘s power.  The foundation of the Twentieth Dynasty 
itself is also evidence for the resentment Egyptians felt toward foreign influence.  
Sethnakht, Ramesses‘s father and the dynasty‘s founder, overthrew a Syrian-descended 
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ruler who was greatly disliked.
55
  That a person of Syrian-decent could claim the throne 
of Egypt suggests the growing influence foreigners were gaining. 
The economic collapse of Egypt under Ramesses‘s authority was also a 
significant cause of tension, and the rise in the habiru, or social outcast, population is 
indicative of these problems.  Habiru were people who fled their villages, usually 
because they could not pay their taxes or had accumulated some form of debt.  Viewed as 
robbers and thieves, the habiru lived on the fringes of society, and despite their being 
recruited as mercenaries to defend the palace complexes, relations between them and the 
settled people were mostly antagonistic.
56
  During Ramesses‘s rule, both Egypt and the 
wider Near East recorded a significant rise in the habiru population, and documents from 
the Egyptian court demand neighboring vassal states to ―Send [them] Habiru…about 
whom [they] have written with these words: ‗[The Egyptian Court] will give them to the 
cities in the land of Kush (Nubia), so [the court] can settle them in the place of those 
[they] have deported.‖57  
Here, the palace‘s concern centers on returning habiru to depopulated lands, 
probably an attempt to improve agricultural yield in the area.  This passage suggests that 
anachoresis, or the abandonment of arable land, had become a major problem in Egypt.  
Hence, during Ramesses‘s rule, rising numbers of habiru combined with the growing 
pattern of anachoresis to reduce crop yields and augment socioeconomic tension.  Even 
worse, the passage mentions that the Egyptian court wanted to recruit habiru to cultivate 
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lands the government had deliberately depopulated.  Acts of forced deportation usually 
stemmed from the court‘s desire to disrupt pockets of rebellious activity, thus suggesting 
that significant hostility toward the central government existed at this time.
58
     
The archive of Deir-El Medina, a village near Thebes populated by workmen who 
built pharaohs‘ tombs, provides further evidence for Egypt‘s economic decline and the 
tensions that resulted from it.  It is unclear when this community first came into 
existence, although written records from the settlement date predominantly from the latter 
half of the Eighteenth Dynasty (1390 BCE) until the end of the Twentieth Dynasty (1069 
BCE).  The village of Deir-El Medina, which produced no food of its own because its 
villagers could not simultaneously engage in agricultural activities and their work on the 
tombs, was entirely dependent on monthly government rations.  The workmen at Deir-El 
Medina are also unique because they were fully literate and often communicated directly 
with the central administration.
59
   
During the Twenty-Ninth year of Ramesses III‘s rule (1159 BCE), 
communication between these workers and the central bureaucracy turned to the subject 
of food: the villagers complained they had not received their allotted rations.  After two 
months of delayed supplies, the workers went on strike and staged sit-down 
demonstrations in front of the temples of Thutmose III and Ramesses II.
60
  The 
community again wrote to Ramesses III, explaining that ―it is because of hunger and 
because of thirst that [they went on strike].  There is no clothing, no ointment, no fish, no 
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vegetables.  Send to pharaoh our good Lord about it and send to the vizier our superior, 
that sustenance may be made for us.‖61  When provisions still did not arrive, the workers 
invaded the Ramesseum and took its grain reserves.  This solution was only temporary, 
however, and trouble flared up again when the grain stores ran out.
62
  In a response to the 
angered community, Ramesses III‘s vizier sent an enigmatic message, writing, ―Now as 
for your saying, ‗Do not take away our ration!‘ am I the vizier who was promoted 
recently in order to take away?  I may not give you what he who is in my position should 
have accomplished—it so happens that there is nothing in the granaries—but I shall give 
you what I have found.‖63 
The tension between the Deir-El Medina community and the Ramessid 
government exposes many of the economic, political, and social problems of the time.  
First, these records highlight the extent of agricultural decline during Ramesses‘s rule.  
According to the vizier‘s reply, the granaries of the central government were empty.  
While this may be an exaggeration, it does reveal that the supply of food was growing 
scarcer.  Furthermore, the government‘s inability to provide food to the workmen can be 
linked to large-scale anachoresis, which would have dramatically lowered the crop yield 
and reduced the amount of grain the government could have collected.  This in turn 
would have led to higher levels of taxation, because the central bureaucracy needed to 
increase its efforts to refill empty state granaries in order to feed the workers at Deir-El 
Medina.  Oppressive levels of taxation would have fed into the cycle of anachoresis, 
further plummeting agricultural productivity while simultaneously elevating the number 
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of habiru.  By the end of Ramesses‘s reign, social and economic tensions had in fact 
become so severe that the Deir-El Medina workmen fled their village and took refuge 
within the confines of Medinet Habu for protection.
64
  The problems at Deir-El Medina 
also called into question the credibility of the Ramessid government.  In his reply, the 
vizier sought to exonerate himself by noting that he had only recently been appointed.  In 
the New Kingdom the vizier headed the central bureaucracy, and this vizierial change 
suggests instability within the palace.  Constantly changing advisers would have 




Mario Liverani similarly argued that during the Late Bronze Age Near East, 
palace complexes throughout the entire region were at odds with the vox populi.  While 
this period was an age of economic growth and exchange, only palace elites reaped the 
benefits of the international system. They accrued wealth and luxuries while the populace 
became further impoverished and burdened with increased labor demands.
66
  Van De 
Mieroop underscores this point by arguing that the palace‘s isolation went beyond social 
and economic levels to encompass a geographical expression.  He writes that territorial 
states at this time all founded new cities where they constructed new palaces, most of 
them located at higher elevation, surrounded by natural barriers, and often walled or 
otherwise protected.
67
  People not associated with the palace continued to live in small 
villages, however, providing the agricultural goods needed to support the ruling elites.  
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It is therefore reasonable to conclude that in the eyes of the Egyptian people, the 
palace of Ramesses III lay at the heart of the problems that Egypt was experiencing.  To 
this end, one significant source of concern for Ramesses must have been his lack of royal 
blood.  Sethnakht was a man of unknown origins and without any royal heritage.
 69
  
While this may not have been of concern at the time of the dynasty‘s founding, the 
subsequent internal problems that plagued Egypt may have called into question the 
legitimacy of his son‘s rule.  Ramesses most likely found himself in a very precarious 
position: not only did waves of internal decline cause his rule to be questioned, but he 
was also without any royal lineage to which he could point to defend his credibility. 
Taken together, the events at this time reflected circumstances associated with the 
loss of ma‘at.  Ma‘at, which translates to ―order‖ or ―truth,‖ was a necessary component 
of the pharaoh‘s power.70  It provided the ideological foundation for his rule and justified 
his authority.
71
  Ma‘at was considered to be a sacred bond between the king and the 
divine: if a ruler was believed to have lost ma‘at, his rule would be invalidated and a 
dynastic change would ensue.
72
  While the concept of ma‘at originated as something 
intangible and loosely defined, over time it developed into a codified dogma.  Emily 
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Teeter explains that by the beginning of the New Kingdom the principle of ma‘at became 
canonized to include a series of rules associated with its proper maintenance.  These 
included practicing proper rituals and religious ceremonies, defending Egypt from 
foreign forces, and ensuring the temples were well maintained and provided with proper 
supplies.  Events such as irregular flooding of the Nile, poor harvests, famines, and 
military defeats were equated with a loss of ma‘at and subsequently a loss of political 
legitimacy.
73
   
In the Egyptian pantheon, ma‘at appeared as a small, female deity often presented 
by the pharaoh to the gods, or vice versa, to indicate divine support for his rule.
74
  Van 
De Mieroop explains that ma‘at was also represented as a feather to indicate its fragility, 
a clear marker of Egypt‘s own delicate state of order and an implicit recognition that the 
pharaoh‘s job was to protect the land from forces of chaos.75  By the time of Ramesses‘s 
rule, this ideological narrative played a prominent role in politics.  Kings who claimed 
ma‘at could justify their right to rule, even if their real political power was diminishing.  
Rulers who used ideological justification as a crutch to compensate for declining political 
influence were far from secure in their authority, however, as rebellious factions would 
often attempt to provide evidence that a king had lost ma‘at, a clearly strategic effort to 
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de-legitimize his rule.  For this reason, pharaohs placed much emphasis on the 
presentation of ma‘at as a means to block threats to their kingship.76  
Intertwined with political ideology during the Ramessid Period was the emerging 
role of religious orders, chiefly the Priesthood of Amun at Thebes.  As the real political 
power of kings began to decline, this group acquired even greater influence.  The 
Priesthood‘s power stemmed from its ability to consult with the divine via oracle, 
supposedly allowing it to directly hear Amun‘s wishes.  For this reason, it is not 
surprising that kings devoted much effort and wealth to winning the favor of the 
Priesthood.  In a time during which the pharaoh‘s power was linked to ideological 
justifications of his authority, gaining the support of the Priesthood would allow him to 
bolster his position.  Proving that a king had ma‘at was a simple task if he had the 
backing of the religious orders, but it was near-impossible if he was not on good terms 
with the Priesthood of Amun.
77
  
As Lesko suggested, Ramesses did not intend to create an accurate narrative, but 
he did aim to achieve something greater than simple self-commemoration.  If Ramesses 
had lost ma‘at, then his rule would have been considered illegitimate and a change in 
leadership would have been justified.  Ramesses‘s Medinet Habu inscriptions attempt to 
show his rule remained in accordance with ma‘at, because doing so would reaffirm his 
own power and weaken the ideological legitimacy of rebellions led against him.  
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Ramesses‘s intention was politically oriented, and the Medinet Habu inscriptions are a 
representation of power that served to ideologically legitimize his kingship.   
 
A Loss of Control 
Ramesses‘s Medinet Habu inscriptions were a response to the tensions existing 
within Egypt under his leadership, and they present a counter-narrative in which he is 
portrayed as a ruler who upheld ma‘at.  In his accounts, tensions take the form of 
northern invasions and represent an idealized version of the loss of control that he faced.  
One example of this loss of control is found in a year five inscription, entitled ―Ramesses 
III Hunting Lions,‖ which shows Ramesses standing in his chariot, firing arrows at 
several lions.  These lions flee in disarray but eventually ―gather themselves together in 
front of [Ramesses III], as wretched as jackals, while they howl like a cat.‖  Recognizing 
their defeat, they ask Ramesses for forgiveness, while Egyptian soldiers and officials 
rejoice over their king‘s victory.78   
 
Figure 6: A bull-hunting scene from Medinet Habu.  This image is analogous to the one 
accompanying the “Ramesses III Hunting Lions” inscription, the main difference being the portrayal 
of bulls as the victims of the hunt instead of lions.  Unfortunately, the lion-hunt relief image has not 
yet been published.  Image reproduced from Murnane, United With Eternity, 68. 
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Beginning with the Early Dynastic Period, pharaohs used lion imagery to 
represent kingship and symbolize their power.
79
  While Ramesses continues in this trend, 
here his use of lions is meant to suggest a loss of control.  By portraying people other 
than himself as lions, Ramesses is intimating that they too claimed the title of pharaoh 
and wanted to usurp his power.  In this scene, however, Ramesses eventually emerges 
victorious over these usurpers, re-establishing control and re-affirming his legitimacy as 
the rightful king.  That Ramesses portrays himself as one who would turn away claimants 
to the throne suggests, however, that his leadership was questioned and his rule insecure.   
The events in this inscription parallel Ramesses‘s campaigns in the Delta but are 
told through animal images.  In his narrative of the northern campaigns, Ramesses 
describes how the enemy chieftains were emboldened in their plans to take over Egypt 
but were unable to execute those plans in the face of his superior military forces.  These 
chieftains, mournful after their loss, were brought before Ramesses and asked if they 
could ―breathe the breath‖ that he gave to Egypt.80  Similarly, Ramesses‘s enemies in this 
inscription were as emboldened as lions by the thought of ruling Egypt, but once defeated 
they knelt before him as debased as jackals.  This allusion to jackals is possibly a 
reference to the god Anubis, who determined if the dead were worthy of entering into the 
Underworld by weighing their heart against a feather.
81
  In this scene, Ramesses himself 
assumes the role of Anubis, judging whether his captured enemies should be allowed 
entry into Egypt.  When they appear before Ramesses, these enemies howl like cats and 
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beg for clemency, signifying their domicile nature.
82
  This image shows the true nature of 
Ramesses‘s enemies: outwardly strong, yet inwardly weak.  On the contrary, Ramesses 
appears brave and just throughout the entire ordeal, attributes associated with a ruler who 
upheld ma‘at.  
Alternatively, this inscription can be analyzed in reference to the core elements of 
a canonical hunting scene.  Davis writes that hunting iconography usually contained four 
main motifs, the first of which was ―the wild animals, the victims of the hunt, [fleeing] 
before wild carnivores or the hunters and their dogs, away from the chariot or the 
hunters‘ arrows.‖83  Ramesses is able to accomplish this by portraying his victims as lions 
who flee before his arrows.  The next core element is ―a particularly fleet, tough 
carnivore or hunting hound [bringing] down a panic-stricken creature in flight, pouncing 
or driving for the throat.‖  Here, Ramesses again uses lion imagery to show himself 
attacking the other lions in the scene and forcing them to submit.  These other lions, 
usurpers to the throne, transform into panic stricken cats in the wake of Ramesses‘s 
pursuit.  In the third common trope, ―the owner of the dogs or the human hunter observes 
the chase and often actively engages in it.‖  This motif is achieved through the active 
participation of Ramesses‘s soldiers and is also found in the latter half of the inscription, 
in which a human Ramesses stands above the captured animals gathered before him.   
The final motif relates to the setting of the hunt, which often is ―in a special 
locale, namely, the rocky desert land, flinty dunes, or mountainous wadis.‖  This provides 
an alternate explanation for why Ramesses described his enemies as jackals: they were 
usually found in these habitats and therefore were almost always included in hunting 
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scenes.  Ramesses writes that they are ―wretched‖ because jackals often destroyed tombs 
in the desert environments in which they lived.
84
  This defamation of sacred sites is in 
contrast to Ramesses‘s own claim that he ―did not overturn the tombs of the lords of life, 
the tomb-chambers of the ancestors, the glorious place which was at the beginning, of the 
lord of Rosta, the divine way of the gods and the cavern-dwellers to the revered dead‖ 
when choosing a location for the construction of Medinet Habu.
85
  In this way, Ramesses 
juxtaposes his proper adherence to Egypt‘s traditions against the un-thoughtful nature of 
his enemies.  
Further animal imagery can be found in bas-reliefs dating to years five and eight 
of Ramesses‘s reign.  Breasted writes that these reliefs contain a ―tamed lion‖ who walks 
alongside Ramesses‘s chariot as Ramesses leads his soldiers into battle.86  As with the 
earlier ―Ramesses III Hunting Lions‖ inscription, these later carvings symbolize 
Ramesses‘s power in the form of a lion epithet.  In this case, however, the lion appears 
pacified and subservient to Ramesses, suggesting it is now only Ramesses who claims the 
title of pharaoh.  Because these reliefs were created after the ―Ramesses III Hunting 
Lions‖ inscription, it is possible that those who tried to usurp Ramesses‘s power had 
either accepted his leadership or met an untimely end.  Another plausible interpretation is 
that new claimants to the throne emerged at this time, represented by the foreign enemies 
opposing Ramesses in these reliefs.  If this were the case, then the tamed lion would 
signify that rightful authority lay with the true ruler, Ramesses III.  Whichever the case, 
these reliefs represent idealized threats to Ramesses‘s power, and they show Ramesses 
successfully regaining the control he had lost.  
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Figure 7: Ramesses III leading prisoners back to Egypt.  Notice the “tamed lion” near the bottom of 
the image that walks alongside Ramesses’s chariot.  Image reproduced from Nibbi, The Sea Peoples, 
96. 
 
Ramesses‘s references to canonical animals indicate the highly metaphysical 
nature of the subject matter, and they illustrate that his main concern rested in providing 
cosmological justification for his rule rather than presenting an accurate recording of 
events.  These types of inscriptions merit an overall ideological interpretation of the text.  
His loss of control was not only confined to animal imagery, however, and the diction 
used to describe his northern campaigns also implies the presence of a forceful opposition 
to his kingship, most likely domestic in its origin.  His interchange between the terms 
―rebels/rebellions‖ and ―invaders/invasions‖ implies that his northern enemies were not 
completely foreign forces, and his inclusion of ―Lower Egypt‖ as one of the Nine Bows 
further indicates the hostility within the region.
 87
  In addition to Ramesses‘s war 
accounts, the fortress-like nature of Medinet Habu itself served as a physical reminder of 
Ramesses‘s power to those who hoped to overthrow him.  
 
A Restoration of Order–Military 
The Medinet Habu inscriptions not only depict the threats that Ramesses faced but 
also show how he restored order to Egypt.  One way Ramesses achieves this restoration is 
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through military victory.  Colleen Manassa, in her discussion of the earlier Great Karnak 
Inscriptions of Merneptah, argues that Merneptah‘s military campaigns represent a larger 
ideological struggle between order and chaos and insists that all Egyptian military 
conflicts contain these ideological undertones.
88
  Manassa‘s theory, which is applied to 
the Medinet Habu inscriptions below, lends even more credence to Ramesses‘s intention 
for ideological justification. 
Ramesses often describes himself as a ―wall casting his shadow over Egypt‖ and 
claims that he maintained the integrity of Egypt‘s borders/boundaries.89  These statements 
not only reflect the xenophobia that had resulted from problems presumably caused by 
mass migrations but also represent common tropes associated with the maintenance of 
ma‘at.  One plausible interpretation is that Ramesses was not describing actual campaigns 
as much as he was placing himself within a larger metaphysical struggle between order 
and chaos.  In Egyptian mythology, a constant battle is waged between Horus, a deity 
associated with Upper Egypt, and Seth, a deity affiliated with Lower Egypt, the Nile 
Delta, and the deserts.  At the end of the struggle, Horus prevails over Seth, leading to the 
unification of Egypt.
90
  Similarly, Ramesses, who often identifies himself either as Horus 
explicitly or in anthropomorphic form (―I was like a falcon/hawk…‖), defeats rebels in 
the Delta to reunify Egypt.
91
   
This Horus-Seth analogy finds further support in that Seth was the Egyptian god 
of chaos, and here Ramesses is smiting forces of chaos in the form of Delta rebels.  In 
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addition, Ramesses‘s declaration of a ―Victory in Thebes‖ further confirms the 
cosmological nature of this struggle.
92
  It implies the victory of Upper Egypt over the 
Delta, a pattern of conquest necessary to the idea of Egyptian unification.
93
  Ramesses‘s 
final inscription on the First Libyan War also contains language suggestive of the 
cosmological nature of the conflict.  Ramesses writes that after the battles, the 
neighboring countries brought tribute to him, and ―south as well as north come to him 
with praise.‖94  Again, this unity between south and north mirrors the outcome of the 
mythological battle between Horus and Seth.  Ramesses‘s desire to mimic this 
cosmological conflict can explain some of the differences between his claims and those 
of Merneptah, such as why Ramesses writes that his enemies came from the north, while 
Merneptah describes campaigns he fought in the west.
95
  
Even if a more literal interpretation is adopted, the Medinet Habu inscriptions still 
contain several motifs clearly indicative of the restoration of order through military 
success.  While much work has been devoted to uncovering the identity of the Sea 
Peoples, they were only one of the perpetrators in the Ramessid texts.  More notably, 
Libyan tribes are the chief antagonists in the wars of years five and eleven, and they also 
fight against Ramesses in his war with the Sea Peoples in year eight.  The Libyans were 
one of the traditional enemies of the Egyptian state, and their defeat symbolized 
continued Egyptian dominance through the vanquishing of a canonical force of chaos.
96
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Ramesses‘s depictions of Libyans being led into Egypt as captives maintains the status 
quo of Egyptian superiority and Libyan subservience.   
Another key feature of Ramesses‘s victories is his cruel treatment of captured 
enemies.  One such instance records that captured warriors were ―bound…upon the place 
of slaughter, they [were] made into pyramids upon their ground.‖97  A later inscription 
details a similar gruesome scene: ―they were scattered, overturned, brought to the ground; 
their blood was like a flood, their bodies crushed on the spot, trampled-----.  The army 
was slain…bound like fowl, laid low upon the [--] under the feet of his majesty.‖98  John 
Darnell has argued that harsh punishments for defeated enemies became a standard 
representation of ma‘at beginning in the New Kingdom, when Tuthmosis I, on his 
campaign to re-unify Egypt, hanged the corpse of the king of Kerma upside down to 
signify a damned afterlife for a person viewed as a force of disorder.
99
  This practice can 
be traced even further back in time to the Early Dynastic Period, when Narmer, the first 
ruler to unify Upper and Lower Egypt, executed human enemies in order to ―reaffirm the 
relationship between the king and the gods, and thereby the balance of order and 
justice.‖100  Ramesses‘s slaughter of his enemies in a similar fashion, along with his 
documentation of the number of hands and phalluses collected from the battlefield is 
representative of the proper maintenance of ma‘at, and it demonstrates how he restored 
order to Egypt. 
The ideological significance of Ramesses‘s campaigns gains added meaning when 
compared to earlier accounts of warfare.  While most historians chiefly draw parallels to 
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Merneptah‘s Great Karnak Inscription, the Medinet Habu accounts also contain tropes 
borrowed from both Ramesses II and Ahmose, the founder of the 18
th
 Dynasty and first 
ruler of the New Kingdom.  The language that Ramesses III employs in the Medinet 
Habu inscriptions is the direct result of Ramesses II‘s influence.  Breasted has defined the 
latter‘s narrative of the Battle of Qadesh to be a turning point in Egyptian military 
literature, remarking that all later accounts adopt a highly figurative and poetic tone in an 
effort to imitate Ramesses II‘s record.101  Lesko has similarly suggested that Ramesses 
III‘s use of blocks from the Ramesseum in the construction of Medinet Habu was an act 
of admiration for Ramesses II.
102
   
The similarities between the Battle of Qadesh and Ramesses III‘s wars in the 
north extend beyond this stylistic and physical imitation, and many of the enemies that 
Ramesses II fought at Qadesh also appear in Ramesses III‘s year eight war against the 
Sea Peoples.  Specifically, the Shardana, a group who fought against Ramesses II at 
Qadesh now appear allied with Ramesses III.  In addition, a group of northern invaders 
who wear what has been referred to as a ―feathered-headdress,‖ are depicted among 
enemy ranks in scenes from both Qadesh and Merneptah‘s Great Karnak Inscriptions.103  
Sandars has suggested that the re-appearance of these enemies in all three ruler‘s 
campaigns may indicate prolonged periods of conflict between Egypt and foreign tribes, 
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although she herself admits it is ―hard to know how far [these images] can be taken 
literally.‖104  
 
        
Figure 8: (top) Soldiers in Ramesses III’s army during his year five campaign.  Notice the Shardana 
solider (horned helmet) near the center and troops wearing the “feathered headdress” toward the 
front.  The standard Egyptian troops appear behind the Shardana warrior. (left) Illustration of a 
Shardana warrior from reliefs dating to Ramesses II’s rule. (right) Illustration of a soldier wearing 
the “feathered headdress” from Ramesses III’s year eight campaign.  While possibly allied with 
Ramesses in year five, this type of warrior was depicted among enemy ranks in year eight.  Images 
reproduced from Sandars, Sea Peoples, 118, 108, and 120, respectively.  
 
In keeping with the ideological subtext of Ramesses‘s campaigns, one possible 
interpretation is that he used the Medinet Habu inscriptions to present a continuation of 
his predecessors‘ conflicts.  By continuing where they left off, Ramesses integrates 
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himself into a tale of military grandeur and shows that he is just as able to defend Egypt 
as they were.  Since Ramesses III was without royal blood, inventing ideological ties 
between himself and successful predecessors would have served to strengthen his 
legitimacy.  To this end, Ramesses III also emulates the appearance of earlier kings in 
temple relief images.  His self-representation in the north wall scene depicting his battle 
against the Sea Peoples is highly similar to that of Ramesses II at Qadesh, and in terms of 
scale, both dwarf all other figures in the image, a trope signifying the importance of the 
ruler in achieving victory.   
Just as Ramesses‘s written records contain cosmological undertones, the north 
wall image is also a pictorial representation of the struggle between order and chaos.  The 
right register, which portrays Ramesses III and his men, is highly organized and follows 
the standardization of poses established by the Egyptian canon.
105
  The Sea Peoples on 
the left, however, are not shown with any such order.  Their boats are disoriented, 
warriors are shown falling out of their vessels and getting struck by arrows, and the 
boatmen/warriors tend to overlap and look frail.  This confused scene presents the 
invaders as a force of chaos and disorder, stressing in pictorial form the mythological 
undertones of a Seth-Horus conflict.  As in the textual accounts, Ramesses‘s victories are 
shown to have resulted in a restoration of order to Egypt.  This is illustrated in the bottom 
register depicting lines of prisoners being led back to Egypt.  This part of the image 
resembles the right half in its organized structure and use of canonical forms, suggesting 
that the end result of the battle between order and chaos (Ramesses and the foreigners) 
was the triumph of order.  The status quo is maintained, as those who hoped to enter 
Egypt do so as captives.      
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Figure 9: Scene from the north wall at Medinet Habu.  Image reproduced from Sandars, Sea Peoples, 
126-27. 
 
Ramesses‘s wars in the north not only correspond to the cosmological battle 
between Horus and Seth, but they also contain tropes reminiscent of King Ahmose‘s 
unification of Upper and Lower Egypt leading to the formation of the New Kingdom.  
Before Ahmose‘s unification campaigns, Egypt was considered to be in a period of 
chaos, known as the Second Intermediate Period, during which foreigners overran the 
land.
106
  According to the inscriptions found in the tomb of Ahmose Son of Ibana
107
, the 
north of Egypt was controlled by the Hyksos from their base at Avaris in the Eastern 
Delta, while the south was under the authority of the Kushite Kingdom based in Nubia.  
King Ahmose, frustrated by the power these foreign groups held, led campaigns in both 
the south and the north, conquering the Kushite Kingdom and sacking its capital, and 
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driving the Hyksos from the Delta into the region of Syria-Palestine.  This narrative ends 
with Egypt once again unified under native rule.
108
   
The Medinet Habu inscriptions contain a similar story to that of Ahmose‘s 
unification.  While the text overwhelmingly deals with Ramesses‘s northern expeditions, 
a few early inscriptions describe campaigns he led into Nubia.  These southern campaigns 
precede Ramesses‘s First Libyan War but follow a narrative similar to his later, northern 
conflicts.  As in the inscriptions pertaining to the Delta conflicts, Ramesses accuses the 
Nubians of ―violating his frontier‖ and wages war against them until they ―prostrate in 
their own blood before his horses.‖  Similarly, he returns from these campaigns with 
Nubian captives, luxury goods, and precious metals.
109
  Ramesses‘s Nubian campaigns, 
which modern scholars have outright rejected as an actual historical event, were included 
because the idea of victory in wars on both the northern and southern fronts became a 
trope associated with Egyptian unification.
110
  As does Ahomse, Ramesses shows himself 
expelling foreigners from both the north and the south, uniting Egypt under native rule, 
and restoring order and harmony in the land.  
Precedent for Ramesses III‘s anachronistic claims of military achievement can be 
found in the actions of Queen Hatshepsut.  Hatshepsut, who first served as regent for the 
young Thutmose III, refused to relinquish her power and instead ruled as full king even 
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when Thutmose came of age.
111
  In response to the intense opposition this caused, she 
commissioned the construction of numerous public works, including a temple at Beni 
Hasan, where an inscription was found that not only expressed her revulsion of the 
Hyksos but also claimed that she expelled them from Northern Egypt.
112
  Hatshepsut‘s 
inscription represented an attempt to prove her legitimacy: by forcing a traditional enemy 
out of Egypt she appeared to uphold order and therefore ruled in accordance with ma‘at.  
It is likely that Ramesses III was faced with a similar predicament: his lack of royal 
blood, along with the social tensions and economic decline incurred during his reign 
jeopardized his right to rule.  As with Hatshepsut‘s records, the Medinet Habu 
inscriptions are a claim to legitimacy: Ramesses expels traditional enemies from Egypt in 
a manner similar to Ahmose, Ramesses II, and Merneptah.  In so doing he inserts himself 
into a line of powerful and respected kings and traces his deeds back to the earliest 
instance of unification under Narmer.  By comparing himself favorably to these earlier 
rulers, Ramesses aims to elevate his own status and demonstrate that he is justified to 
rule. 
 
A Restoration of Order–Religious 
In a fashion similar to his self-portrayal as a military hero, Ramesses‘s proper 
veneration of the gods is another important element meant to show that he restored order 
to Egypt.  In the Medinet Habu inscriptions, Ramesses becomes synonymous with 
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ma‘at—he is the figurative representation of order and truth within Egypt and is pitted 
against foreign intruders who are representative of chaos and disorder.  These enemies 
hope to dethrone Ramesses, thereby removing ma‘at from Egypt.  This narrative is best 
expressed in Ramesses‘s statement from his year eight campaign that, ―[his] heart is filled 
with truth everyday, his abhorrence is lying ---- the gods are satisfied with truth.‖113  This 
passage associates Ramesses with truth, thereby personifying ma‘at through him.  The 
fact that ―the gods are satisfied with truth‖ means that they support Ramesses, as he 
himself represents truth.  Furthermore, Ramesses writes that his ―abhorrence is lying,‖ 
lying being the antithesis of truth and representing an element associated with the loss of 
ma‘at.  One can infer from this passage that Ramesses writes that he does not lie because 
this action would not satisfy the gods, who are interested only in truth.  Truth, in turn, 
corresponds to the proper maintenance of ma‘at. 
Ramesses‘s boasts provide further examples of actions he took to appease the 
gods.  He specifically denotes his gifts to the temples, writing that he ―[increased] the 
divine offerings, [flooded] them with provisions, [and] doubled for [them] the feasts over 
what they were previously, to make [their] shrine festive again.‖114  He further adds that 
he ―fashioned [them] with divine images…equipped [them] with priests and prophets, 
serfs, fields, and cattle.‖115  The purpose of these acts, which are only loosely related to 
his military campaigns in the north, is to align Ramesses with the religious orders in 
Thebes.  To this end, Ramesses claims to have bequeathed 2,954 sq. kilometers of 
agricultural land and 107,615 male servants to the Egyptian temples, 80% of these gifts 
going to temples in Thebes, acts which clearly parallel the gifts given to the temples after 
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  While text and action should not be considered one and the 
same, Ramesses‘s real-life donations may be an attempt to add some truth to his bold 
statements, and may in fact provide the ―ring of historical reality‖ that Weinstein believes 
exists in the accounts.  More importantly, his large-scale gifts to Theban Temples are 
clear attempts to win their support, and they strengthen the argument that the Medinet 
Habu inscriptions should be read for their underlying ideological meaning.   
It is for this reason that many of the laudatory portions of the text show 
Ramesses‘s proper veneration of the gods and describe his rule as divinely ordained: 
―Amun [selected and found him] in the midst of hundred-thousands, so that [he was] 
established upon [Amun‘s] throne in peace.‖117  Being chosen as ―the sole lord of the two 
lands‖ by Amun both bolsters Ramesses‘s ideological power and tightens his affiliation 
with the Theban religious orders.
118
  Furthermore, Ramesses‘s constant declarations of a 
―Victory in Thebes‖ are additional attempts to align himself with the Priesthood of 
Amun: he shares his victory with them and acknowledges that only with the aid of Amun 
was his success possible.
119
  These near interminable references to Amun suggest that 
Ramesses was actively seeking approval from the Theban Priesthood in order to 
legitimize his rule. 
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Relief images along the temple walls also indicate the importance of the Theban 
Priesthood in Ramesses‘s political agenda and support the claim that Ramesses‘s war 
accounts were a tool through which he could gain their backing.  One recurring motif in 
the reliefs is the depiction of the Theban Triad: the god Amun, his wife Mut, and their 
child Khonsu.
120
  Most of the images depict Ramesses presenting offerings before the 
Triad or show the Triad bestowing power and signs of legitimacy upon him.  This Triad 
also played a prominent role in the inscriptions themselves, asking Ramesses to partake 
in the northern campaigns, presenting him with a sword to signify his pre-determined 
victory, and confirming his kingship.  In return, Ramesses delivers those he captured to 
them and respectfully acknowledges that he owes his successes to the Triad.
121
  This 
overt display of religious devotion enabled Ramesses to show that his rule was divinely 
supported despite the significant problems within Egypt.  
 
Figure 10: Ramesses III presenting gifts and captives before the Theban Triad.  Image reproduced 
from Nibbi, The Sea Peoples, 83. 
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A Cultural War 
 Establishing a rift between foreign and Egyptian is another undercurrent in 
Ramesses‘s narrative, possibly related to the influx of foreign peoples and spread of 
foreign cults into Egypt at the time.  If Ramesses himself represents truth and order, then 
his enemies are representative of the ―lie‖ hated by the gods, and by preventing them 
from entering Egypt, Ramesses is securing truth—and ma‘at—throughout the land.  
Ramesses‘s northern campaigns can be interpreted as a cultural war in which he tried to 
maintain the integrity of Egypt‘s border from foreign contamination. 
A chronological analysis of the Medinet Habu inscriptions shows that Ramesses 
increasingly tends to establish a binary between values associated with Egyptian identity 
and those associated with a foreign entity.  This foreign entity, regardless of its ethnic 
affiliation, is always associated with Baal, one of the main deities in the Syrian pantheon.  
Murnane has suggested this to be a form of ―loyalist propaganda‖ meant to remind the 
Egyptian people of Sethnakht‘s expulsion of the despised Syrian leadership.122  In terms 
of Ramesses‘s own situation, the influx of foreign elements into Egypt probably 
contributed to the social and economic decline of the time.  He tries to right the ship in 
his inscriptions by distinguishing between foreign and Egyptian and associating himself 
with the latter.  While Ramesses refers to himself as Baal in some year five inscriptions, 
these comparisons decrease in the latter half of his accounts.
123
  Yet, his foreign enemies 
can still only understand him when he is associated with this deity.  By creating this 
ideological rift between himself and his opponents, Ramesses demonstrates that he rules 
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in accordance with ma‘at.  He associates himself with the proper deities of Egypt, 
recognizes his power stems from them, and identifies himself in their image.   
The inscriptions on the year eight war against the Sea Peoples and the Second 
Libyan War of year eleven best exemplify this pattern.  When describing the campaigns, 
Ramesses refers to himself as a ―bull/ram with two horns charging‖ into battle.124  This is 
probably an allusion to the ram form of the god Amun, a cult image that was extremely 
popular in Upper Egypt and Nubia.
125
  Conversely, his enemies describe him as ―coming 
forth like Baal‖; they cannot understand him through standard Egyptian terminology but 
can only explain his aura in relation to their own foreign pantheon.
126
  By dissociating 
himself from what were considered threats and sources of disorder, Ramesses appears 
less accountable for their movement into Egypt and his rule seems more aligned with 
ma‘at. 
Ramesses accentuates the schism between himself and his enemies by contrasting 
his deep understanding of Egypt and her long-standing traditions with the ephemeral 
knowledge of the Delta inhabitants.  He writes in his inscriptions that the rebels who 
waged war in the Delta ―knew not Egypt forever.‖127  Ramesses advances his position by 
arguing that the rebels believed themselves fit to rule, but because of their lack of 
knowledge actually threatened the peace in their attempt to gain power.  He questions 
how people so unaware of Egypt‘s customs could presumptuously express an intention to 
rule, and in a rationalization to justify his own power contrasts their actions against his 
proper adherence to traditional practices.  Ramesses‘s narrative makes those he fought in 
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the Delta look like foreigners while simultaneously elevating his own position as the 
guardian of tradition and order.  The Delta groups appear as forces of chaos that 
Ramesses prevents from penetrating Egypt‘s borders.   
To this end, Patricia Bikai writes that it is no coincidence ―the rebels who know 
not Egypt forever…tell their people that Ramesses is like Baal.‖128  In reality, the Libyan 
tribes and coalitions of Sea Peoples probably would not worship Baal (a Syrian deity), 
but Ramesses was less interested in accurately identifying his enemies than in showing 
that they were not Egyptian.  Who they were was not as important as the fact that they 
were simply foreign and therefore unfit to enter Egypt, and there was no better way to 
express this than to associate them with Baal as a way to stir up anti-Syrian resentment 
within Egypt.  This narrative is a response to the increasingly blurred social situation in 
which Ramesses lived.  With Egypt quickly becoming home to people from a variety of 
different backgrounds, Ramesses attempts to reassert his power by displaying his 
knowledge of traditional Egyptian values.  In the face of an influx of foreign peoples and 
ideas, the Medinet Habu inscriptions show Ramesses to be rooted in tradition.  
 
A Statement of Tradition 
In a continuation of this trend, Ramesses‘s Medinet Habu inscriptions are replete 
with symbols traditionally used to display power.  His emphasis on canonical imagery 
was a clear attempt to indicate that he ruled in accordance with ma‘at.  These symbols are 
found extensively in Plate 46, an inscription which details Ramesses‘s military 
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campaigns in the Delta in his eighth regal year.
129
  In this plate, Ramesses carries the 
―crook and flail,‖ a canonical symbol of justice associated with the Delta.130  This can be 
interpreted as an attempt to affix established Egyptian customs onto a region whose 
values had become diluted by the diverse populations living there.  By holding the ―crook 
and flail,‖ Ramesses illustrates that he still maintains order over the Delta and has 
prevented forces of chaos from successfully entering Egypt‘s borders.   
Ramesses‘s similar use of regional crowns in this plate represents an additional 
example of the prominence traditional imagery had in his inscriptions.  He describes 
himself as wearing both the separate White Crown of Upper Egypt and Red Crown of 
Lower Egypt, as well as the Double Crown that combines the two.  This trope is not 
unique to Ramesses‘s reign, but as Teeter explains, Ramesses portrayed himself wearing 
the royal crowns more than any other New Kingdom pharaoh.
131
  His repetition of this 
motif suggests the important role it played in his self-aggrandizement, and it also shows 
the Medinet Habu inscriptions to be part of a larger traditionalist response to foreign 
influences in Egypt.  Both the crook and flail and the regional crowns give Ramesses the 
aura of a just and righteous king, unlike his Delta opponents, who are portrayed as forces 
of chaos that make them unworthy of Egypt and disruptive of ma‘at. 
 Perhaps the clearest expression of traditional imagery is the bas-relief on the south 
wall of Medinet Habu, which depicts Ramesses III smiting defeated chieftains as they 
prostrate before him.  He appears colossal in size when compared to his shirking enemies, 
and his pose closely resembles that of King Narmer from the Narmer Palette.  Both adopt 
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a wide-legged stance, drive what has been described as a ―large wand‖ into their enemies, 
and wear the White Crown signifying authority over Upper Egypt.  Narmer was 
considered to be the original founder of Egypt and his namesake palette shows him 
striking down his enemies in his campaign to unify the land.
132
  Narmer‘s pose became an 
integral part of the Egyptian artistic canon as early as the Third or Fourth Dynasty, and 
here Ramesses borrows this oft used motif in an effort to justify his own power.
133
  By 
copying this image, Ramesses creates both the illusion of a return to Egypt‘s glorious 
past and portrays himself as responsible for this restoration.  His decision to use this trope 
also relates to its underlying ideology—it implies a unification and order that is made 
possible by the defeat of forces of chaos within Egypt.  These themes were of great 
importance to Ramesses, because he was confronted with a loss of control in the Delta.  
Adopting Narmer‘s pose signified that Ramesses still maintained order—and held 
ma‘at—in Egypt.  To this end, the goddess ma‘at has often been portrayed holding a 
wand or stave, and Ramesses‘s driving of a ―large wand‖ into his enemies further 
suggests the conquest of order over chaos and depicts Ramesses as a ruler who quite 
literally acted in accordance with ma‘at.134  Ramesses‘s decision was also a logical one: 
this motif has deep ideological implications connected to the traditional story of Egypt‘s 
first unification, and it is a trope whose meaning would have been understood by the 
native Egyptian populous.  This scene of unification through violence would represent 
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the climax of Ramesses‘s narrative and is perhaps the ultimate example of Ramesses 
casting himself in a positive light in the face of intense internal pressure.   
 
Figure 11: (left) South Wall Scene at Medinet Habu depicting Ramesses’s triumph over the defeated 
chieftains.  Image reproduced from Murnane, United With Eternity, 19. (right) Front side of the 
Narmer Palette, which probably served as the model for Ramesses’s pose.  Image reproduced from 
Nibbi, The Sea Peoples, 21. 
 
While Ramesses‘s use of traditional imagery is chiefly a response to the influx of 
foreign cultures into Egypt, his own lack of royal blood cannot be ignored.  Ramesses‘s 
own ambiguous origins, complemented by the social and economic deterioration that his 
rule brought, would have left him searching for ways to manifest his credibility.  His 
prolific use of imagery from the Egyptian canon and his desire to create an ideological 
schism between himself and his opponents are the means through which he achieved this 
goal.  Ramesses was not only intent on showing that his opponents were not Egyptian—
he was just as interested in showing he was. 
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In fact, Ramesses actually twisted the crutch that was his humble origins into an 
additional form of positive self-representation.  The relief above the high gate of Medinet 
Habu, which depicts Ramesses III presenting ma‘at, luxury goods, and war captives to a 
seated Amun, is an ideal example of such a portrayal.
135
  This scene can be interpreted as 
an extension of Ramesses‘s war narratives, displaying the aftermath of his campaigns.  
As in the accounts themselves, Ramesses is shown venerating the gods and presenting 
them offerings.  This corroborative evidence supports the notion that Ramesses‘s war 
narratives were aimed at gaining the favor of the Theban priesthood.  More importantly, 
Ramesses portrays himself wearing sandals, a feature not often represented in scenes of 
veneration.  One plausible explanation is that by representing himself this way, Ramesses 
was better able to win the favor of the Egyptian people.  This relief was located in a 
portion of the temple accessible to common Egyptians and, as Teeter explains, sandals 
were common garb for the lower classes.
136
  A shod Ramesses would have been easily 
recognizable to the Egyptian people and perhaps would have fostered a sense of unity 
between Ramesses and his subjects.  This image turns one of Ramesses‘s weaknesses—
his lack of royal lineage—into a powerful attribute.  Here he uses his humble background 
to build an ideological connection between himself and his people: Ramesses shows 
himself as sharing a common, non-royal origin with the people of Egypt before his good 
deeds and faith resulted in Amun selecting him as king.   
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Figure 12: Ramesses III presenting gifts to a seated Amun.  This relief is found in a private room 
along the South Wall of the temple, and unlike the High Gate relief, was probably inaccessible to 
most people.  While Ramesses portrays himself wearing sandals in the High Gate relief, here he 
appears barefoot before the gods.  Image reproduced from Murnane, United With Eternity, 47.  
Unfortunately, a reproduction of the High Gate relief could not be obtained for this work. 
 
A Kingdom at Peace 
Ramesses‘s depictions of Egypt are also an attempt to show that he ruled in 
accordance with ma‘at.  While in actuality the land was plagued with starvation and 
hardship, Ramesses describes Egypt as ―festive with food and provisions,‖ with ―grains 
thereof being like the sands of the shore, [its] granaries approaching heaven, their heaps 
like mounds.‖137  This was a clear claim to legitimacy on the part of Ramesses, because it 
was the pharaoh‘s responsibility to both ensure good harvests and maintain the food 
supply.  These themes are repeated in an inscription dating to Ramesses‘s Twelfth regal 
year, supposedly one year after his victory in the Second Libyan War.  This inscription 
can be read as an epilogue to Ramesses‘s war narratives, showing the new age of peace 
and prosperity his victories brought unto Egypt.  Here, the god Amun lists all the riches 
                                                        
137
 Edgerton & Wilson, Historical Records, 123. 
Peters 51 
Egypt has been blessed with under Ramesses‘s reign: ―Niles bearing sustenance, [that the 
land is endowed] with wealth, food, and sustenance, so that [the people‘s] land is flooded 
in [Ramesses‘s] presence, and game is in the place where [Ramesses] walkest.‖138  This 
picturesque image fits into the larger narrative that Ramesses was trying to construct: 
through his military victories, he kept the forces of chaos at bay and ushered in a new era 
of order throughout the land.   
With its highly defensive fortifications, the temple of Medinet Habu itself was 
also a statement of security, and much like the text and images inscribed upon it, it 
demonstrated Ramesses‘s ability to protect his people.  To this end, several portions of 
the text present Ramesses as the keeper of the peace within Egypt.  One such scene is 
found in the prelude to Ramesses‘s Year Eight campaign, in which all the people of 
Egypt are gathered around Ramesses as he warns them of the approaching enemies but 
confidently assures all of his predetermined victory.
139
  This image is a ploy meant to 
show Egypt as a united whole under Ramesses‘s leadership.  It depicts all social classes 
accepting Ramesses‘s claim that he will defeat the northern enemies as they declare his 
―Victory in Thebes.‖  Ramesses is recognized as the military protector of Egypt by all its 
people: they are confirming Ramesses‘s ability to uphold one of the chief tenants of 
ma‘at and therefore recognizing his authority.  This physical gathering of Egypt‘s people 
around Ramesses is a scene of harmony and stability, and is possibly a response to the 
social tensions rampant throughout Egypt at the time.  
The final inscription of Ramesses‘s year five campaign against the Libyans can 
also be interpreted as an allusion to this peacekeeper motif.  In this passage, Ramesses 
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describes the security that his victory brought to Egypt: ―the land is like – with 
untroubled heart.  A woman goes about at her will, with her veil upon her head, her going 
extending as far as she pleases.‖140  Egypt is depicted as a land of peace, its people filled 
with a renewed sense of security because of Ramesses‘s heroic efforts.  Furthermore, this 
woman, whose mention appears strange and out of place in the context of the larger 
work, probably is a personification of ma‘at.  By literally placing a figural representation 
of ma‘at in his narrative, Ramesses is indicating that through his victories, he has 
returned ma‘at to Egypt.  Ramesses‘s mention that this woman can travel as far as she 
pleases serves a dual purpose: first, it illustrates a united Egypt.  Since ma‘at exists 
throughout the land, then Ramesses‘s authority has been confirmed and accepted by all 
its people; there is no longer any need for domestic rebellions because the land has an 
―untroubled heart.‖  Second, it implies a sense of security associated with long distance 
travel and trade, a feeling which may have been comprised by the growing number of 
habiru during Ramesses‘s rule.  Ramesses demonstrates to the people of Egypt that the 
land is safe enough for even the most fragile of figures—ma‘at—to traverse without fear.  
Egypt is united under Ramesses, who appears before his people ―like Ra at early 
morning.‖141  The enemies in the north—representative of lies, chaos, disorder, 
darkness—have been dispelled and ma‘at has been restored to Egypt as a result of 
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Concluding Remarks 
Egypt under Ramesses III was a land plagued with economic, social, and political 
tensions.  Fearing possible insurrection because of these problems, Ramesses devoted 
much effort to presenting himself as a ruler who possessed ma‘at in order to justify his 
power in the face of internal tensions.  The Medinet Habu inscriptions, which discuss 
how he protected Egypt‘s northern border from waves of external invasion, represent one 
of his presentations of power.  While his claims should not be taken literally, the 
inscriptions have value in their underlying ideological messages that served to strengthen 
his authority.  Ramesses appears as an ideal king in every way: knowledgeable of Egypt‘s 
traditions, respectful of its deities, and understanding of his own responsibilities as ruler.  
Thus, Ramesses‘s self-presentation is geared toward showing he ruled in accordance with 
ma‘at.  To further justify his authority, Ramesses used the inscriptions to associate 
himself with successful earlier kings and to align himself with the Priesthood of Amun.  
The Medinet Habu inscriptions therefore represent a propaganda device meant to 
legitimize Ramesses‘s power in the face of insecurities brought about by the troubled 
times over which he ruled.   
 
Looking Forward 
 While this work attempts to provide an exhaustive argument in order to illustrate 
the ideological subtext present within Ramesses‘s accounts, there is still much that needs 
to be done before their meaning can be fully understood.  One line of study would be to 
examine the organization of space of temple objects and reliefs in relation to the message 
that Ramesses was trying to convey.  As previously mentioned, Ramesses‘s war 
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narratives are only one part, albeit a crucial one, of Medinet Habu, and it would be useful 
to explore how this section of the temple is spacially related to other scenes of self-
representation or even how accessible these reliefs were to people not affiliated with the 
temple complex.  We have already seen, for example, how Ramesses‘s self-
representation in the High Gate relief is unusual because of its accessibility to all 
members of society.  Yet, this image still expresses Ramesses‘s desire to show that he 
ruled in accordance with ma‘at.  Further comparative analysis of the temple reliefs 
themselves could help to clarify the role of the war inscriptions.
142
   
 In addition, although this work does discuss similarities between Ramesses‘s 
inscriptions and those of earlier rulers, it shies away from a full-fledged comparative 
analysis.  Despite the grandiose nature of Ramesses‘s war narratives, they are not unique 
in what they say or even how the events are described.  More detailed analyses between 
Ramesses‘s accounts and the similar inscriptions of Merneptah could be useful in 
determining if the same problems that beleaguered Ramesses also afflicted Merneptah.  
Manassa has already discussed the ideological undertones of Mernerptah‘s work: does 
this mean that he too was struggling to establish his legitimacy as ruler?  If so, what 
problems presented themselves during his rule that made this kind of justification 
necessary?   
 If we look at Ramesses‘s later years, we see that his rule ended quite abruptly—
with his assassination in the so-called Harem Conspiracy.
143
  This successful attempt on 
Ramesses‘s life was the culmination of years of court intrigue and conflict, probably 
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brought on or made worse by the socioeconomic deterioration occurring throughout 
Egypt.  The events of the Harem Conspiracy, which unfolded within the confines of 
Medinet Habu while Ramesses was there celebrating a religious festival, raise further 
questions concerning the stability of Ramesses‘s power.  If he met his own end at the 
hands of his closest attendants, then how secure was his rule in his early years?  Is 
Ramesses‘s self-portrayal as a powerful military hero completely ideological in design, or 
did fear for his own life serve as practical inspiration for this sort of self-representation?   
 Finally, much research still needs to be done to determine what historical truths—
if any—the Medinet Habu texts contain.  This work analyzes the inscriptions through an 
ideological lens and presents an argument built upon previous authorship discrediting the 
validity of Ramesses‘s accounts.  This argument, however, represents merely a single 
niche in an ecosystem of scholarship, and ink is continuously being spilled in the hopes 
of uncovering the meaning behind Ramesses‘s narratives.  Whether that meaning is based 
in practicality, ideology, or historicity, there is still a long, yet exciting, road of 
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